Files
homelable/backend/app/api/routes/media.py
T
Pouzor 7db57bba3b fix: resolve media file by directory listing to kill path-injection taint
Match the validated filename against iterdir() entries with == instead of
building a path from the user string, so no tainted value ever reaches a
filesystem sink. Satisfies CodeQL py/path-injection.

ha-relevant: no
2026-07-07 14:35:44 +02:00

101 lines
3.7 KiB
Python

"""Generic media upload/serve endpoint.
Images are stored on disk (see `Settings.media_dir`) with server-generated
UUID filenames — never in the DB, and the client filename is never trusted.
Upload/delete require auth; GET is public so plain <img> tags and the read-only
live view can load images (filenames are unguessable).
Currently used by the floor-plan feature; kept deliberately generic so future
raw-image uploads reuse the same endpoint.
"""
import re
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, UploadFile, status
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
from app.api.deps import get_current_user
from app.core.config import settings
router = APIRouter()
# content-type → extension. Also the allowlist of accepted uploads.
ALLOWED_TYPES: dict[str, str] = {
"image/png": ".png",
"image/jpeg": ".jpg",
"image/webp": ".webp",
}
# Magic-byte signatures for defense-in-depth (don't trust content-type alone).
_MAGIC: dict[str, tuple[bytes, ...]] = {
".png": (b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n",),
".jpg": (b"\xff\xd8\xff",),
".webp": (b"RIFF",), # RIFF....WEBP; RIFF prefix is enough to reject non-images
}
MAX_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # 10 MB
# Only ever serve/delete files we created: 32 hex chars + known extension.
_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{32}\.(png|jpg|webp)")
def _resolve_media_path(filename: str) -> Path:
"""Return the existing media file named `filename`, or raise 404.
`filename` is validated against `_NAME_RE` (no separators, no `..`), then
matched by name against the actual directory listing. The user string is
only ever compared with `==` against trusted `iterdir()` entries — it never
builds a path — so a crafted value cannot escape the media dir.
"""
if not _NAME_RE.fullmatch(filename):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Not found")
base = settings.media_dir()
if base.is_dir():
for entry in base.iterdir():
if entry.name == filename and entry.is_file():
return entry
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Not found")
@router.post("/upload")
async def upload_media(file: UploadFile, _user: str = Depends(get_current_user)) -> dict[str, str]:
ext = ALLOWED_TYPES.get(file.content_type or "")
if ext is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_415_UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE,
detail="Unsupported media type — PNG, JPEG, or WebP only",
)
# Read one byte past the cap so we can detect oversize without loading more.
data = await file.read(MAX_BYTES + 1)
if len(data) > MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_413_CONTENT_TOO_LARGE,
detail="File too large (max 10 MB)",
)
if not data:
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Empty file")
if not any(data.startswith(sig) for sig in _MAGIC[ext]):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_415_UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE,
detail="File content does not match its type",
)
media_dir = settings.media_dir()
media_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
name = f"{uuid.uuid4().hex}{ext}"
(media_dir / name).write_bytes(data)
return {"filename": name, "url": f"/api/v1/media/{name}"}
@router.get("/{filename}")
async def get_media(filename: str) -> FileResponse:
# _resolve_media_path returns only an existing file, else raises 404.
return FileResponse(_resolve_media_path(filename))
@router.delete("/{filename}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def delete_media(filename: str, _user: str = Depends(get_current_user)) -> None:
_resolve_media_path(filename).unlink()