coli_cuda_load did LoadLibraryA("coli_cuda.dll") with a bare name. Windows'
default search order includes the current working directory (and, without
SafeDllSearchMode, other writable locations), so an attacker who plants a
coli_cuda.dll where the user launches glm.exe — or inside a downloaded model
directory the user cd's into — gets their DllMain executed at load time:
DLL hijacking -> arbitrary code execution.
Now the loader resolves the path next to glm.exe via GetModuleFileNameA and
loads that exact file with LOAD_WITH_ALTERED_SEARCH_PATH, so both the DLL and
its dependency search are anchored to the trusted install directory. Fallback
(if GetModuleFileNameA ever fails) uses LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR |
LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 — which also excludes the CWD. Cross-compiles clean
under mingw-w64; the CPU path is unaffected (this file is _WIN32-only).
Note: grammar.h gr__rule memcpy was reviewed in the same pass and is safe (len
is clamped to 63 into a name[64] buffer).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
JustVugg
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