72e36772f5
Colibri loads model directories and safetensors from mirrors it does not control, so the file's declared shapes and byte spans are attacker-influenced input. Three memory-safety holes on that boundary, independently confirmed (incl. a from-scratch adversarial audit that re-derived the same two) and present in the shipped v1.0.0: - st.h st_read_f32: numel came from the shape, nbytes from the offsets, with no cross-check. A crafted tensor whose shape inflates numel past nbytes made the BF16/F16 loop read past the malloc'd raw buffer and the F32 memcpy write past the caller's config-sized destination (heap OOB read + write). Now enforce numel*esz == nbytes before any copy. - st.h header parse: the shape product could overflow int64 to a small/negative numel that would then pass the cross-check. Guard each multiply. - glm.c qt_resolve_fmt (new, replaces the three duplicated "?1:?2:3" fmt sites in qt_from_disk and both expert_load arms): the old inference SILENTLY fell to int2 for any unrecognized weight byte count, so a too-short weight became a valid int2 whose matmul read O*I nibbles past the buffer; and an oversized scale array overflowed the per-row t->s. Now the weight bytes must match a known int8/int4/int2 layout and the scale array must match the expected per-row (O) or grouped (O*ng) cardinality, else refuse. - glm.c config/generation_config slurp: unbounded ftell -> malloc(n+1) gave a hostile file a load-time OOM, and on malloc failure b[got]=0 was a NULL deref. Cap at 256 MB and NULL-check. Verified: TF token-exactness unchanged on every quant format (full-precision 32/32, int4 11/32, int2 1/32, mix 5/32 -- byte-identical to the pre-change binary); fmt=4 grouped path preserved (the scale check is by construction the same condition detect_group_size already imposed); a hand-crafted hostile safetensors is refused cleanly; ASan+UBSan clean on legit and hostile loads (only the pre-existing intentional startup leaks remain). These are the C trust-boundary items of #368, landed as a minimal standalone fix; the server-side and build items of that PR follow via its rebase. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>